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Reconceptualising the Police Complaints Process as a Site of 
Contested Legitimacy Claims  
 
Abstract 
 
An effective police complaints system is important in securing and maintaining police 
legitimacy. There is, however, a lack of clarity regarding the nature of the relationship between 
the two. What does it mean for the police complaints system to be effective and how does it 
contribute to the legitimacy of the police? Further, what does the way in which the complaints 
system operates reveal about how police legitimacy is conceived? This article argues that 
police legitimacy can be analysed by reference to two ideal types, organisational and 
constitutional legitimacy.  In developing these ideas, it contends that reconceptualising the 
police complaints system as a key site where they become contested will enhance normative 
debate in this area. In addition, conceiving of the police complaints system in this broader 
sense also serves to highlight the importance of its function in providing the data that will make 
such debate meaningful.  
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 Introduction  
 
The accountability of individual police officers for their actions is one of the fundamental 
elements of police legitimacy in a democratic state (Smith 2010, 2013).  Further, the police 
complaints system is an important mechanism for bringing officer misconduct to light (Sanders 
and Young, 2008: 302) and the efficient and appropriate functioning of the system is considered 
fundamental to securing public confidence in the police (Maguire and Corbett 1991, Smith 
2001, 2005, Waters and Brown 2000). It is consequently taken as axiomatic that the complaints 
system plays an important role in securing police legitimacy. There is, however, a lack of clarity 
regarding the nature of its role in this regard.  Debates about police complaints systems have 
become dominated by two analytical approaches. One focuses on the practical functions of the 
process and, in particular, on complainants’ needs and experiences (Maguire and Corbet 1991, 
Landau 1996, Learch 1998, Strudwick 2003, Waters and Brown 2000, Smith 2001, 2009). A 
second considers the need for external involvement in the police complaints system and the 
difficulties inherent in achieving such involvement (Goldsmith 1991, Goldsmith and Lewis 
2000, Porter and Prenzler 2012, Prenzler et al 2013, Prenzler and Ronken 2001, Savage 2013a, 
2013b). While acknowledging the importance of both bodies of work, this article seeks to 
introduce a new approach. It identifies two forms of police legitimacy, organisational and 
constitutional, and suggests that conceiving of the police complaints system as a site for 
determining the correct balance between them will enhance normative debate in this area. 
Significantly, this conception of the police complaints system also highlights how an important 
democratic function of the process is to provide the data that would make this normative debate 
meaningful. 
The first section of this article outlines some of the limitations inherent in the two approaches 
that currently dominate analysis and empirical enquiry in the area of police complaints. Section 
two develops the ideas of organisational and constitutional legitimacy in the context of policing 
and points to how they assist in structuring debates concerning the question of how officer 
conduct should be judged. The final section applies this analytical frame to the current police 
complaints system in England and Wales and discusses the ways in which it invites new 
emphases in the empirical and normative questions that might be asked1.   
                                                          
1 The discussion of constitutional legitimacy draws on the constitutional position of the police in England and 
Wales and the primary focus of the paper is the complaints handling process in these areas. However, research 
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1. Conflicts and Circularity in Discussions of Police Complaints Systems  
  
Maguire and Corbett suggest that the police complaints system has four main functions: the 
satisfaction of complainants; the enforcement of discipline in the ranks; feedback to police 
managers; and the maintenance of public confidence in the police (1991: 13).  This purposive 
approach is reflected in later analysis by Smith whose examination of the research and policy 
developments in police complaints processes since the 1960’s also suggested that it serves four 
functions. He labelled these “managerial, liability, restorative and accountability (2004:20)2 
and they can be aligned with the four objectives identified by Maguire and Corbett3. However, 
while it is useful to separate the functions into categories for analytical purposes they are clearly 
interconnected. Indeed, Maguire and Corbett accept that their four functions may contradict 
each other (1991: 182) and Smith found that, while his four functions could be “analytically 
separated”, they were, in fact, so closely related that he abandoned plans to construct a system 
model approach that utilised them (2004: 16).  
Given the four potentially conflicting functions of the police complaints system it is difficult 
to determine what it means for it to be ‘effective’. Its stated primary purpose is not the 
‘satisfaction of complainants’ but the determination of whether officers should be disciplined 
in respect of their conduct and if so to what degree (Maguire and Corbett 1991:11-12, Reiner 
1991: 211, Smith 2004:16). Nevertheless, there is little research relating to the impact of 
complaints on discipline in the ranks or the degree to which it assists with feedback to police 
managers. Maguire and Corbett’s study does address these issues, but the author knows of no 
subsequent research directed specifically to the discipline and feedback functions4. 
An alternative means of assessing the effectiveness of the system is by reference to ‘outputs’ 
in terms of substantiated complaints. However, this raises the question of what would be 
considered an appropriate percentage for substantiation and Prenzler and Ronken argue that 
the direct, quantitative ways in which the ‘effectiveness’ of the complaints process might be 
                                                          
from other jurisdictions is drawn upon and it is contended that the proposed analytical frame will be relevant to 
broader debates concerning police complaints processes.  
2 Also see Landau 1996 who suggests four similar functions for police complaints. 
3 For Smith ‘liability’ in this context is used to denote the individual liability of the officer by means of disciplinary 
outcomes which it is submitted links to Maguire and Corbett’s’  ‘discipline in the ranks’. 
4 Porter 2016 draws attention to the feedback functions of oversight agencies. See also Prenzler et al 2013, Porter 
and Prenzler 2016, and Prenzler 2016 for a summary of the results of complainant and police satisfaction surveys 
from a number of jurisdictions.  
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assessed, are too complex and interrelated to be of value. They suggest that, instead, any such 
assessments need to be made on the basis of more indirect indicators such as “complainant 
satisfaction and public confidence levels”5 (Prenzler and Ronken 2010: 156). It is contended 
however that these are also unsatisfactory indicators. This is, in part, because, as noted above, 
complainant satisfaction is not the main stated aim of the system. More importantly, reliance 
on these indicators also leads to an uncomfortable circularity.  
There has been much important and interesting research on complainants’ views and 
experiences (Landau 1996, Learch 1998, Strudwick 2003, Waters and Brown 2000). These 
works note the difficulty in determining what it means for a complainant to be ‘satisfied’.  
Satisfaction may be linked only to the result i.e. whether the complaint is upheld and the officer 
disciplined. Alternatively, while a complaint may be unsubstantiated, complainants may 
nevertheless gain some satisfaction from the way it is handled or, for example, any explanation 
they receive concerning the incident about which they are aggrieved (Maguire 1991: 191, 
Strudwick 2003: 40, Waters and Brown 2000: 629-630). However, on each of these levels the 
conclusion of research into complainants’ experiences is that they are consistently and 
profoundly negative (De Angelis 2009, Grace and Buck 2009, Maguire and Corbett 1991, 
Smith 2003, Strudwick 2010, Waters and Brown 2000)6.  Grace and Buck note that the 
available studies regarding complainants’ satisfaction tend to be either dated or based on very 
small samples (2007: 4). However, their review of the results of the 2006/2007 British Crime 
Survey7 revealed that, of those who had used the complaints system, 80% were dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied with the way the complaint was handled by the police (2007: 8)8.  
As noted in the introduction, it is frequently suggested that an effective complaints system is 
of great importance in securing and maintaining public confidence in the police (Hewitt 2002: 
5, Smith 2001: 372, Strudwick 2010: 37). Further, in much of the literature there is a 
presumption or implication of a directionally causative link between the two i.e. that an 
effective complaints system will lead to increased confidence in the police. The IPCC is 
statutorily required to ‘secure that public confidence is established and maintained’ in the way 
                                                          
5 They also suggest public awareness of their rights in relation to police behaviour, and independent auditing of 
agency procedures (2010: 156). 
6 These sources show consistency of results as regards complainants’ satisfaction in a number of jurisdictions.  
7 Carried out for the Independent Police Complaints Commission “IPCC” in relation to England and Wales 
(Grace and Buck 2009:4). 
8 A significant exception is the experience of complainants in relation to the Police Ombudsman of Northern 
Ireland in respect of which see the discussion in Porter and Prenzler (2014: 83-86).   
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the complaints system operates9 and, not surprisingly, this has, therefore, been the focus of its 
own research. There have now been six IPCC surveys carried out since 2004, each of which 
consisted of approximately 4,000 interviews with members of the public. Respondents were 
asked whether they would complain if they were ‘really unhappy’ about how the police had 
acted towards them, taking positive responses as indicators of confidence in the complaints 
system. The most recent 2014 survey suggests an increase from 60% of respondents in 2008 to 
73% of respondents in 2014 who would definitely or probably complain if they were really 
unhappy about how a police officer behaved towards them (Harvey et al, 2014)10. On this 
measure then the system may be seen as ‘effective’ in a general sense.  This leads to the 
uncomfortable situation whereby, despite the vast majority those who use the complaints 
system being very dissatisfied with it, and indeed, many having less confidence in the police 
(or even the law) as a result (Waters and Brown 2000: 627,631, Strudwick 2010: 43, Young et 
al 2005:300) it can be found that there is general public confidence in it and that it is thereby 
at some level ‘effective’.  
The respondents in the IPCC surveys were also asked whether they had had contact with the 
police and whether they were happy with that contact. The results show that those who had a 
positive experience during contact with the police were “considerably more likely” than those 
whose experience had been negative, to give a positive response to the main research question 
above, (i.e. that they would complain if they were unhappy about an officer’s conduct) (Harvey 
et al 2014: 14). This suggests that it is confidence in the police that is a potential driver of the 
inclination to complain and that confidence in the complaints system might be seen as a 
barometer of confidence in the police. It is, therefore, necessary to question the presumption 
implicit in the way the role of the complaints system is commonly articulated (i.e. that 
confidence in the complaints system may operate to increase confidence in the police) and a 
better starting point might be to address the considerable levels of reflexivity that the 
relationship is likely to embody.  
The call for independent involvement in the process adds a further level of complexity. 
Research into complainant satisfaction consistently shows that complainants would have 
greater confidence in the system if it contained a higher level of external involvement or 
                                                          
9 Police Reform Act 2002 s10(1)(d), s10(2). 
10 The 2014 survey however used a four point rather than a five point scale for responses so comparisons should 
be viewed with some caution (Harvey et al, 2014: 14).   
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oversight (Maguire and Corbett 1991, Landau 1996, Learch 1998, Strudwick 2003, Waters and 
Brown 2000). This presents a number of tensions. 
First, the fact of independent oversight may have negative consequences. The police have 
argued that any non-police investigator will necessarily lack the understanding and experience 
required to fairly judge how an officer has conducted him or herself in any given situation 
(Mark 1978, Herbert 2006, Reiner 1991, 2010 ). A corollary to this is the view that too much 
external involvement will erode officer morale and ultimately undermine police authority 
(Hudsen, 1971, Wells and Schafer 2007). Further, while external oversight may increase 
confidence in the complaints system, the very fact of independent investigation and oversight 
of police complaints has inherent in it the idea that the police cannot be trusted to investigate 
complaints themselves. Hence, while bolstering confidence in the way complaints against them 
might be handled, external oversight can also operate to undermine confidence in the police at 
some levels.  
Second, while analytical and empirical studies have discussed different types of independence 
(Smith 2009) and considered differing levels of independent oversight (Prenzler and Ronken 
2001) they have also queried the effectiveness and even the possibility of true independence 
(Savage 2013a, 2013b). There is, therefore, a reasonable concern that the idea of independent 
involvement may operate to increase general public confidence in the system when the de facto 
level of independence it embodies is considerably less than commonly understood (Savage 
2015: 36).  
Third, this potential disparity between public confidence based on independent oversight and 
the actual level of practical independence within the system, magnifies the tension noted above 
between the confidence the general public has in the system and the experiences of its users. 
Smith notes how it is ‘axiomatic that the persons most likely to have cause to complain are 
those who interact with the police the most’ and that these people tend to be the ‘disempowered 
disadvantaged and discriminated against’ (Smith 2009: 254). Hence ‘hierarchies of credibility’ 
emerge whereby the police account of events is given greater credence than that of potential 
complainants (2009: 245). The emphasis on public confidence within the complaints system in 
England and Wales, therefore, operates to reinforce this hierarchy of credibility for dissatisfied 
complainants because they are expressing negative feelings concerning a system that is shown 
to be ‘effective’ on the basis that it is enjoying increasing levels of  general public confidence.  
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These tensions are inherent in the empirical data discussed above, but are rarely directly 
addressed.  Arguably this is, in part, because the analysis of police complaints noted in the 
opening paragraphs encourages the practical function of the system and the level of 
independence it involves to be considered separately. In contrast, this article advocates a more 
overarching approach whereby, the function of the police complaints system is considered at a 
different level - the level of its legitimating potential in respect of policing in general. The 
following section sets out and develops two ideal types, organisational and constitutional 
legitimacy which it is argued provide a framework for this broader functional enquiry.  
  
2. Constitutional and Organisational Legitimacy    
 
The previous section drew attention to the complex reflexivity that exists between confidence 
in the police complaints system and confidence in the police. Similarly, it was noted how the 
levels of confidence placed in the complaints system by the general public may not be reflected 
in the experiences of complainants. Police officers perceptions of complaints systems are also 
important (not least because their cooperation with the process is of significant practical 
importance (Porter 2016: 244-245)). This raises the question of how conflicts between the 
interests of these separate stakeholders’ should be reconciled and illustrates that while 
confidence and legitimacy in this context are linked, the two ideas are not coextensive.   
Consequently, it is contended that, in order to assess whether a police complaints system is 
effective in enhancing the legitimacy of the police, it is first necessary to develop an analytical 
framework by which to judge what it means for the police to be legitimate. This section seeks 
to provide such a framework. 
Legitimacy is a deeply contested concept. Weber distinguishes between the way in which a 
social scientist and a moral philosopher should conceive of legitimacy, arguing that the social 
scientist’s enquiry should be limited to a study of what people believe as legitimate. Hence for 
him “legitimacy is equivalent to belief in legitimacy and legitimate power is power that is 
believed to be legitimate” (Weber, 1956: 23)11. For Beetham this approach has been an 
“unqualified disaster” for the social sciences since it fails to recognise that “[a] given power 
relationship is legitimate not because people believe in its legitimacy but because it can be 
                                                          
11 Original quoted in (Beetham 1991: 9). 
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justified in terms of their beliefs” (1991: 10). This more nuanced position, which reflects the 
distinction between confidence and legitimacy noted above, is to some extent borrowed from 
Habermas’s work. However, for him it only makes sense to refer to legitimacy in the context 
of political orders. “Only political orders can have and lose legitimacy; only they need 
legitimation. Multinational corporations and the world market are not capable of legitimation” 
(Habermas 1979: 179). In contrast, Suchman brings together a whole body of work on 
organisational legitimacy, noting how it might be sought, maintained and recovered after a 
crisis (Suchman 1995). This tension between legitimacy understood as necessarily associated 
with political orders and the idea of it being a quality that organisations can also possess is at 
the heart of the distinction between police constitutional and organisational legitimacy which 
this section seeks to develop.   
Police legitimacy is uniquely complex because as “the specialist repositories for the state’s 
symbolic monopolisation of legitimate force” (Reiner 2010: 17) an aspect of their legitimacy 
rests on their constitutional position. Their mandate extends to interference with personal 
liberties for the prevention and detection of crime and their practical and symbolic presence as 
the body tasked with ensuring security within the territory, results in elements of their overall 
‘legitimacy’ being bound to the legitimacy of (and conferred on them by) the state. However, 
the idea of operational independence demarcates an element of police work which is practically 
and symbolically separate from the state. Their discretion at street level, as regards operational 
issues, requires that as an institution they must maintain their ‘legitimacy’. This section 
explores these two facets of police legitimacy which are labelled constitutional legitimacy and 
organisational legitimacy and develops them as ideal types12. 
There are a number of binaries or tensions in debates concerning the nature of policing. The 
police have a dual role of crime control and keeping the peace and are often described in a 
binary way as “citizens in uniform” (Reiner 2010: 75). There is also discussion regarding the 
extent to which police authority is autonomous or paternalistic (Walker 1996) and more 
generally whether the police are better understood as a force or a service (Reiner 2010: 141). 
The ideas of constitutional and organisational legitimacy are aligned with these binaries but 
function at a different level. The primary distinction between constitutional legitimacy and 
organisational legitimacy is that the while the former is connected with the mandate to use state 
                                                          
12 Here Lopreato and Alston’s understanding of these as theoretical idealisations is adopted. Neither form of 
legitimacy is entirely achievable or desirable on its own, but the points where they conflict and/or complement 
each can be used to structure empirical enquiry and normative debate.     
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sanctioned force, the latter is concerned with the police as an organisation remaining worthy 
of that mandate. Hence, constitutional legitimacy may be seen as operating in a top down 
fashion and sees the police as embedded state actors whereas organisational legitimacy 
operates from the ground up and has its roots in the police relationship with the public in 
general.   
From the perspective of constitutional legitimacy the police operate under a mandate from the 
state which, prima facie, has to be susceptible to precise articulation of its reach. Consequently 
officers’ actions must be legitimated at a constitutional level by compliance with the rule of 
law.  This view of police legitimacy requires (or has implicit in it) a sense that there are distinct 
boundaries as regards the mandated interference with personal liberties and that determination 
of where those boundaries have been contravened is non-contentiously justiciable. On this 
conception of police legitimacy the primary mechanism for holding individual officers to 
account will be one dominated by clear codes and rigorous evidence gathering which can lead 
to a firm finding of breach or otherwise. Similarly there is little scope for mitigation in relation 
to, for example, a technically unlawful arrest which did not stem from any mal fides on the part 
of the officer involved. 
However, although the police mandate is in relation to state sanctioned interference with 
personal liberties, the police are not understood constitutionally as a direct instrument of the 
state or of the Crown. Each Chief Officer enjoys operational independence13 and each constable 
exercises his powers with original rather than delegated authority14. The scope of that authority 
is defined and confined by law but (despite the ‘ideal’ description set out above) there is 
inherent indeterminacy in those laws that set out the boundaries of officers’ actions e.g. 
reasonable suspicion and reasonable force.15  Consequently, operational independence and the 
indeterminacy of the boundaries of the mandate combine such that constitutional legitimacy 
alone will not suffice.  This can be seen at a number of levels.  
First, as regards the direct use of force Lustgarten, draws on the multiple ways in which an 
officer may use his discretion when attending a minor disturbance and argues that:  
[t]o say that he must uphold the law, or is responsible to the law is in practical terms 
meaningless. His discretion involves either making value judgments about the 
                                                          
13 R v Commissioner of the Metropolis exp Blackburn [1968] 2 Q.B. 118.     
14 Cattle v Lewis [1938] 458. 
15 For example s24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
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worthiness of the people involved, or public feeling, or the seriousness of the incident 
or the long-term gains and losses involved in sanctions of varying severity 
(Lustgarten 1986: 11).  
Hence, policing may not always be susceptible to the level of adjudication implicit in 
constitutional legitimacy. More importantly, in this example the distinction between a breach 
of the law or codes of conduct in the course of positive action and the quality of an officer’s 
decision making in the discretion not to act, breaks down. Suppose in Lustgarten’s fight 
situation an officer arrests person A rather than person B. The legal rules may determine that 
the arrest was lawful, but, importantly it might have also been lawful to arrest B and not A. 
That no charges could subsequently be brought because, on the evidence, A was the aggressor 
and B had a legitimate defence would not, of itself, make the arrest unlawful. So the arrest of 
either A of B might be legitimate at a constitutional level.  However, if the officers’ actions are 
not in accord with a public consensus concerning the police decision to arrest A (and therefore 
the exercise of the discretion not to arrest B) the legitimacy of the police will be undermined 
at an organisational level. This highlights the importance for the police to be responsive to and 
therefore to maintain some connectedness with the general public. Such connection16 may be 
difficult in a multi-cultural society if there is lack of cohesion (Martin 1993: 142) and in an 
apparently cohesive community, responses to police conduct may differ (Jones 2008: 695, 
Waddington et al 2015). However, it is important to note that the police both come from and 
are generative of the communities they serve (or operate within) (Herbert, 2006) and this 
connectedness is fundamental to the policing process.   
The distinction between constitutional and organisational legitimacy can be further developed 
by reference to the practical consequences of the police operating on a 24 hour basis and their 
role being to restore order whenever it has broken down. Importantly, the status of the police 
as the bearers of the ability to use state sanctioned force impacts upon how they are perceived 
and able to operate in this regard (Bittner 1975). Consequently, Walker argues that when 
confronted with the need to restore order neither the “range of problems [officers are faced 
with] nor their range of treatments can be confined within narrow legal terms” (1996: 56). The 
suggestion here is that the mandate to interfere with personal liberties (which is theoretically 
confined within the rule of law) in fact, in practical terms, operates such that it is necessarily 
extended beyond those theoretical limits in certain circumstances. “Their solutions may be of 
                                                          
16 Connection with the community is one of the motivating factors in the move towards ‘community policing’ 
which it is accepted is complex. For a discussion of the main issues see Tilley 2008. 
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the first-aid variety but [the police] potential to exercise coercive force ensures that the plaster 
will adhere, if only in the short term” (1996: 57). In such circumstances, an officer may be 
found to have acted unlawfully (if, for example, the circumstances were not deemed sufficient 
for the legal defence of necessity to apply) but his actions may nevertheless be seen as 
appropriate at an organisational level. Walker suggests that despite the constitutional 
discomfort inherent in a suggested extension of police action beyond strict adherence to the 
rule of law on the basis of exigency “such characterizations of the police role resonate with 
broader public understandings” (1996: 57). It is contended that recognising those ‘broader 
public understandings’ is an important element of police organisational legitimacy. 
Finally, this need to be responsive to ‘broader public understandings’ is also important because, 
while the ability to resort to force underpins everything officers do at one level (Bittner 1975), 
in practical terms they are dependent on public support. They rely on the general public to 
comply with their requests, for example in relation to traffic control or crowd management. 
Further, they are also dependent on the public to voluntarily come forward with information 
that will assist in the apprehension of offenders (Tyler 2004: 85). The police, therefore, need 
to foster a general conception of their legitimacy in the sense of being an organisation the public 
would wish to support in both these ways. The use of minimal force; a commitment to 
procedural justice (Tyler 2004); sensitivity in handling non-emergency situations; fair, polite 
treatment of citizens in everyday encounters and a commitment to diversity in employment etc. 
are features that would bolster this organisational legitimacy. Moreover, all these elements are 
dependent on the police as an organisation being able to recruit and maintain a well-trained, 
well-motivated, committed work force.   
At some levels the ideas of organisational and constitutional legitimacy may be seen to 
complement each other, with the connectedness that forms the bedrock of organisational 
legitimacy operating to supplement or mitigate the rigours inherent in judging officer conduct 
by reference to the ideas associated with constitutional legitimacy alone. There are, however, 
points at which these complementary elements start to conflict (for example where rigid 
enforcement of disciplinary codes is seen as eroding officer morale) and it is submitted that a 
focus on these moments of conflict will enhance both debates about the police complaints 
system and future research concerning it.   
This section has introduced the ideas of constitutional and organisational legitimacy and argued 
that they provide a valuable framework for exploring the tensions that exist in the perspectives 
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by which officers’ conduct might be judged. The following section examines how these ideas 
assist in analysis of the police complaints system in England and Wales and the current plans 
regarding its reform.  
 
3. Constitutional and Organisational Legitimacy and the Police Complaints 
process  
 
The police complaints process in England and Wales is currently governed by the Police 
Reform Act 2002 (PRA). This extended and renamed the process of informal resolution 
introduced by s85 the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE).  Now called local 
resolution, it applies when the complaint in question would not result in any criminal or 
disciplinary proceedings if it was substantiated17. More significantly, the PRA also established 
the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) which has the power to investigate 
complaints about serious18 matters itself and to manage or supervise some internal police 
investigations of complaints. However, the Home Affairs Committee Report 2009-1019 
indicates, that in 2008-2009 the IPCC directly investigated only 1% of all complaints and that 
they managed only 10% of the serious cases referred to them.  Therefore, the vast majority of 
complaints which might result in disciplinary consequences for officers are still handled 
entirely by professional standards departments in each force with the IPCC acting as an appeal 
body20 in relation to the recording and outcome of these ‘local investigations’. 
On 22 July 2014 the Home Secretary Theresa May announced a review of the police 
disciplinary system21 under the chairmanship of Major Chapman. The focus of this was the 
disciplinary process rather than the handling of complaints and although these are inherently 
linked, detailed consideration of the Chapman Review is beyond the scope of this paper. It is 
submitted, however, that the framework outlined in section 2 will be of use in analysis of the 
proposals put forward in the review and, in particular, may assist in the benchmarking process 
which is suggested. These issues are referred to briefly in subsection 3.3.   
 
                                                          
17 PRA 2002 s6(3)(a). This process is discussed below. 
18 These include serious assault, serious sexual assault serious corruption. The Police (Complaints and 
Misconduct) Regulations 2012. 
19 HC366, para. 7. 
20 PRA Schedule 3. 
21 See Hansard 22.7.2014 Col 1265. 
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3.1 Local Resolution   
 
Local Resolution permits complaints into matters that would not result in disciplinary 
proceedings if they were upheld, to be handled at divisional level under relatively informal 
procedures22. Local resolution can take a number of forms, (IPCC Statutory Guidance 2015: 
32-33) but in essence the officer who is tasked with conduct of the matter seeks to ‘resolve’ 
the dispute taking account of the views of both the complainant and the officer(s) complained 
against. McLaughlin and Johansson point to the value of local resolution lying in its “ability to 
focus attention on the resolution of the grievance rather than establishing ‘innocence’ or guilt’ 
on the part of the officer” (2002: 641). Further, Young et al’s study involving a scheme in 
which local resolution included a specifically restorative element supports the contention that 
it can have positive results in this regard (Young et al 2005). 
 
Unfortunately this potential is not fully realised (Maguire and Corbett, 1991: 88-9, Young et al 
2005: 2870-300, May et al 2007: 23-24).  The IPCC upheld 33% of appeals in relation to Local 
resolution in 2009//10 (IPCC Annual Report 2009/10: 3) and while a significant proportion of 
these related to communication during the process, 10 % were upheld because the complaint 
was too serious to be dealt with by local resolution and a further 28% on grounds that there 
was either no documentation or the actions agreed did not address all aspects of the complaints 
(Hagger-Johnson and Hipkin-Chatagnol 2014: 17-18). Significantly in 19% of cases the IPCC 
recommended that a local investigation be conducted (2014:17-18). This suggests a difference 
in assessment of the gravity of officers’ conduct as between forces and the IPCC in nearly on 
fifth of all cases.  
 
As suggested above, those complaints for which local resolution should apply represent 
opportunities for the police to enhance their organisational legitimacy and much could be done 
in this regard by improving communication with both complainants and police officers (May 
et al 2007, Hagger-Johnson and Hipkin-Chatagnol 2014: 17-18). However, in the context of 
the appeals of a more substantive nature, the analytical frame suggested in this paper is valuable 
in drawing attention to the need to consider how the operation of the complaints system may 
influence stakeholders’ confidence. Poor communication concerning the process of local 
resolution may impact negatively on complainants’ confidence in that process and may result 
                                                          
22PRA 2002 s8.  
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in some consequential loss of confidence in the police. However, it is contended that a 
perceived failing by the police to fully recognise, respect or implement the rules relating to 
their own disciplinary framework, will result in a qualitatively different response which centres 
on a reduction in the confidence of both complainants and the public in the police. This invites 
future research which focuses on these qualitative issues. It also highlights the importance for 
discussions of ‘public confidence’ to be clear concerning whether reference is being made to 
confidence in complaints process (or an aspect of it) or confidence in the police.  
 
The Government is currently proposing to give Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) the 
ability to decide whether to handle local resolutions themselves23. Conceiving of the complaints 
system in terms of organisational and constitutional legitimacy suggests this that this would be 
a mistake. A properly conducted local resolution has the potential to enhance police 
organisational legitimacy by providing opportunities for officers to develop a heightened sense 
of how their actions affect members of the public and by giving complainants a feeling of open 
interaction about the incident in question. This potential for local resolution to enhance police 
connectedness to the general public will be undermined if the process is taken out of police 
hands. Instead the focus for reform should be on ways for it to fulfil its potential in this regard.  
 
 
3.2 Local Investigations  
 
As indicated above, the majority of complaints which are not suitable for local resolution are 
subject, instead, to local investigation and handled in their entirety by the professional 
standards department of the force in question. For the last three years between 32 and 37% of 
all complaints have included allegations of what might be termed unconstitutional conduct24 
and it is contended that, therefore, a significant proportion of those which are subject to local 
investigations will involve issues that concern constitutional legitimacy. Consequently, it is in 
these complaints that conflicts between organizational and constitutional will become apparent 
                                                          
23 “Improving Police Integrity: reforming the police complaints and disciplinary systems. Home Office (CM. 
9031: 12). 
24 By which is meant complaints which included oppressive conduct, malpractice and breaches of PACE. See 
IPCC complaints statistics 2012/2013, 2013/14 and 2014/15).  
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and the frame suggested in this paper, invites enquiry concerning which form of legitimacy is 
given primacy in local investigations25.  
There is consistent concern that substantiation rates for police internally investigated 
complaints and, in particular, those concerning assault and false arrest are inappropriately low 
(Leiderbach et al  2007:354, McLaughlin and Johansen 2002:638, Saunders and Young 2008: 
302, Smith 2009:251)26. It is acknowledged that there are evidential difficulties in these types 
of cases and many commentators have noted how the incidents which give rise to such 
complaints frequently arise in low visibility settings with few witnesses (Martin 1993, 
Goldsmith 1991a, Reiner 1991, 2010). In research conducted in the US, Leiderbach et al (2007) 
found that while for police-initiated complaints the substantiation rate was 70%, this dropped 
to just 1.6% in relation to citizen complaints. For these, the most common reason given for the 
complaint not being upheld was that there was conflicting evidence, such that the matter could 
not be proved. They concluded that while “[b]y their nature these types of complaints are 
impossible to prove based on a preponderance of evidence [] certainly it is unreasonable to 
assume that all but 3 of 180 citizen complaints in our sample were without merit” (2000:370).   
This raises concerns regarding the way investigations are conducted and evidence weighed in 
relation to citizen complaints. As regards the positon in England and Wales, a quote from one 
of the investigation officers interviewed by Maguire and Corbett is potentially illuminating.   
If the officer denies the allegation and there were no other witnesses, what can I do? 
The problem is [] if they’re truthful people, they wouldn’t understand why their word 
can’t be accepted. They can’t understand that it’s their word against the officers 
(emphasis added) (1991: 79-81).  
Although Maguire and Corbett’s research is now quite dated, this quote suggests that a rigid 
approach is adopted whereby an assessment of the veracity of the parties to the complaint is 
considered inappropriate (at least in relation to the formal outcome of the complaint). In any 
event a recent review of appeals upheld by the IPCC found that the majority27 of local 
investigations were “upheld either because insufficient evidence was gathered during the 
investigation of the complaint or because the conclusions reached were not reasonable in light 
                                                          
25 It is accepted that there is some commonality between these two types of legitimacy in that a clearly unlawful 
arrest will undermine both types of legitimacy and an interesting further project would be to assess which form 
is given primacy in various narratives concerning police complaints.  
26 In England and Whales the substantiation rate has been 14% for the last two years two years and was 12 % in 
2012/13 (IPCC Police Complaints Statistics 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15).  
27 41% (2012:11). 
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of the evidence gathered” (Hagger-Johnson and Hipkin-Chastagnol 2012: 11). It is submitted 
that one explanation for this is a recognition by investigators of the impact of police 
occupational culture on officers’ responses to the complaints process.  
Research over a number of decades has pointed to the influence of police occupational culture 
in the determination of complaints. As long ago as 1975 Box and Russell’s review of 
complaints files suggested a police practice of arresting potential complainants in order to 
discredit them and that this was effective (Box and Russell, 1975). More recently, Goldsmith 
has noted how observational studies reveal a common practice amongst police officers to lie in 
order to protect their colleagues from the possibility of disciplinary sanctions and a recognition 
of this by senior professional standards officers (Goldsmith 1991: 25). Further, Smith has 
pointed to the high instance of false imprisonment and malicious prosecutions claims in 
successful civil actions against the police as evidence that the police use false arrest to cover 
their own wrongdoing by discrediting potential claimants (Smith 2001: 376). 
As noted above, the prime function of the complaints process has been to decide whether 
officers should face disciplinary charges and if so determine the outcome (Maguire and Corbett 
1991:11-12, Reiner 1991: 211, Smith 2004:16). However, despite consistently low 
substantiation rates, there is evidence that forces do take account of the impact of occupational 
culture on the way officers seek to avoid disciplinary action. The argument here is that this 
process is linked with organisational rather than constitutional concerns. Maguire and Corbett’s 
interviews with investigating officers suggest that there is an internal and external ‘face’ to 
how local investigations are handled.  An unsubstantiated finding against an officer who was, 
in fact, believed to have behaved unprofessionally might result in him being “posted, 
counselled, told to mend his ways, or put with a stickler of an Inspector” and on the whole the 
complaints system was seen “as more effective in what was done behind the scenes than in its 
official results” (1991: 73).   
There is some value in a system which permits offices to be counselled about their conduct 
without necessarily applying blame in relation to specific incidents. However, it is important 
within a democracy that the parameters concerning the type or level of conduct for which that 
form of internal response is appropriate should be transparent. The concern is that for the 
external face of local investigations, a rigid ‘rule of law’ approach to evidence gathering by 
professional standards officers’ results in any conflict of evidence being understood as 
necessitating a finding of “not upheld”.  However, at the same time, the internal face of the 
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complaints system operates behind the curtain of the unsubstantiated finding and preserves 
determination of the balance between the organisational and constitutional legitimacy of officer 
actions to the police in ways that are not available to public scrutiny.  
For officers complained against, the consequences of a finding of misconduct can be very 
serious and the disciplinary process must therefore contain safeguards. As a result, some 
complaints will inevitably be unsubstantiated in circumstances where there is doubt as to the 
probity of the officers’ conduct and some degree of an ‘internal face’ for these complaints is 
unavoidable.  Arguably, however, the rigidity of the approach taken by professional standards 
officers to the gathering and weighing of evidence operates to unreasonably expand the 
‘internal face’ of complaints in ways that are not transparent.   
That there may be a tendency on the part of the police to expand this internal face for local 
investigations resonates with police concerns regarding officer morale and the insistence on 
their professionalism and experience being paramount in the proper handling of complaints 
process (Maguire and Corbett 1991: 70, Reiner 1991). The existence of such a tendency is also 
supported by Leiderbach et al’s research in which the force in question employed detailed 
classifications of complaints outcomes which included unsustained, unfounded, exonerated 
and which arguably invites enquiry as to whether these labels served some ‘internal’ function 
(2007: 364-365). 
The suggestion that the approach to evidence gathering in local investigations operates to create 
an internal and external ‘face’ as regards officer discipline is, however, given most credence 
by recent research concerning ex-police officers working within the IPCC. In the context of 
questions about their role within the IPCC, such officers expressed the view that only 
investigators with police experience who can really ‘read between the lines’ and recognise what 
is omitted from officers’ accounts (Savage 2013b). These respondents summed up their views 
with expressions like “you set a thief to catch a thief” and “you can’t bullshit a bullshitter” 
(2013b: 896). What is striking here is that for local investigations (which are investigated in 
their entirety by police officers) in relation to events which occurred in low visibility settings, 
the consistently low substantiation rates are justified by there being no way to drill into the 
veracity of competing accounts of events. Arguably, therefore, the way the local investigation 
processes are interpreted and used by forces functions to preserve their autonomy rather than 
being an unavoidable aspect of complaints about street level policing.   
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The above discussion suggests that, rather than being a point at which the complaints system 
becomes dominated by constitutional perspectives, local investigations appear to be handled 
predominantly at an organisational level and subject to a police determination of the correct 
balance between constitutional and organisational legitimacy. It is contended that, as suggested 
in relation to local resolution, it will be valuable for future qualitative studies to consider how 
the operation of the complaints system influences stakeholders’ confidence in both the system 
and the police. For example, arguably, what has been termed the ‘internal face’ of local 
investigation is beneficial for police morale which is a component of police organisational 
legitimacy. However, empirical studies of the type suggested above might indicate that it has 
negative consequences in relation to complainants’ confidence in the system and overall public 
confidence in the police. There is, therefore, an important normative question to be addressed 
concerning how these potentially competing interests should be balanced. The analytical 
framework suggested in this paper is valuable in highlighting the importance of that question 
and will assist in structuring debates concerning how it might be resolved.   
   
3.3 The Role of the IPCC  
 
It was argued in section 3.2 that within the local investigation process the police seek to 
preserve their autonomy to determine the majority of complaints with an emphasis on 
organisational legitimacy. This section considers whether the process becomes dominated by 
constitutional concerns for those cases in which the IPCC conducts investigations itself. 
 
3.3.1 Investigations  
 
As noted above, research into complainant experiences of police complaints consistently 
concludes that a greater level of independent oversight or involvement would increase public 
confidence in the process (Maguire and Corbett 1991, Landau 1996, Learch 1998, Strudwick 
2003, Waters and Brown 2000).  It is contended that inherent in the demand for greater 
independence is the idea that it equates with a commitment to constitutional legitimacy;  that 
it is, in effect, a demand that the organisational balances of perceived situational imperatives 
and officer morale are not taken into account and  that constitutional legitimacy should be the 
sole driver of how complaints are determined. This is supported by McLaughlin and 
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Johannson’s comments as regards “marginalised, disenfranchised communities and 
discriminated against social groups”. They argue that these groups have such deep trust issues 
with the police that “certain forms of seemingly ‘minor’ police misconduct, rather than being 
diverted into restorative justice, will have to be subject to the full rigour of independent 
investigation and adjudication” (2002: 651)(my emphasis). The underlying rhetoric of 
independence is that the ‘full rigour’ of investigation is centred on whether there was a breach 
of the rules which govern the grant of the mandate to interfere with personal liberties and not 
on whether that breach might be seen as mitigated by perceived exigency on the part of the 
officer(s) involved.   
However, as regards the independence of IPCC investigations, a Home Affairs Committee 
report of 2012-13 indicated that approximately 11% of staff and 33% of investigators were 
former police officers. Further, recent research by Savage found that investigations conducted 
by the IPCC are substantially hampered by reliance on police support both as regards resources 
(for example expert forensic services) and police cooperation as regards access to the materials 
or personnel relevant to the investigation (Savage 2013b: 106-107). It also cited a number of 
deficiencies in the IPCC’s internal operations including; “a propensity to uncritically accept 
police explanations for missing evidence”; a “lack of investigatory rigour” and a “failure to 
critically analyse competing accounts, even with inconsistencies between officers’ accounts or 
an (sic) compelling account from a complainant”28.  
Furthermore, the promise of independence as delivering a finding that is based solely on the 
ideas inherent in constitutional legitimacy is not express in the IPCC’s role. The statutory 
function of the IPCC is to secure the maintenance of ‘suitable’29 arrangements with respect to 
the handling and recording of complaints, that those arrangements are efficient and effective30 
and that public confidence is maintained31 in respect of them32. This is problematic because (as 
discussed in section 1) there is lack of consensus concerning what it means for the police 
complaints system to be effective (or at least in how that might be measured) and the system 
can enjoy increased public confidence in circumstances where the majority of those who use it 
remains dissatisfied at a number of levels. Arguably, therefore the emphasis on public 
                                                          
28 HC494 pp5-6. 
29 s10(1)(a) and S 10(2)PRA 
30 s10(1)(b) PRA.  
31 S10(1)(c) PRA 
32 As regards the lack of clarity as to the IPCC’s role generally see Smith 2005. 
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confidence shifts the balance between organisational and constitionally legitimacy towards the 
former without that shift being expressly stated or justified.   
The above discussion indicates that despite the suggestion of ‘full rigour’ in the investigation 
of complaints, the IPCC is neither fully functionally independent of the police nor necessarily 
fully committed, at an institutional level, to the constitutional ideals of strict adherence to the 
rule of law. Instead, in its joint task of ensuring ‘effectiveness’ and ‘public confidence’ it is 
essentially also seeking to balance organisational and constitutional legitimacy and this invites 
future research concerning how this balance is reached in this part of the system.  
 
3.3.2 Appeals  
Notwithstanding the apparent deficiencies noted above, the IPCC has upheld a significant 
proportion of appeals against both the recording and outcome of complaints33. In the complex 
business of policing there is inevitably considerable scope for differing interpretations of the 
severity of an incident that might give rise to a complaint and the subsequent weighing of 
evidence. However, as discussed in section 3.2 the review of these appeals figures does suggest 
a difference of approach to these issues as between professional standards officers and the 
IPCC (Hagger-Johnson and Hipkin-Chastagnol 2012: 11). This, therefore, represents an 
important opportunity to assess the different way in which organisational and constitutional 
legitimacy are balanced in the two different parts of the system and invites further research 
which focuses on these points of difference.  Specifically, it suggests that a detailed review of 
those appeals which are upheld on the basis of either the gathering or weighing of evidence 
which takes account of the nature of the complaints in these cases and seeks to uncover what 
may have influenced the decisions at force level not to uphold those complaints (whether there 
was any ‘internal’ consequence for the officer(s)).   
 
3.3.3 The Chapman Review  
The Chapman Review seeks to introduce increased transparency in relation to the police 
discipline system34. It proposes a  number of reforms aimed at promoting a ‘values’ oriented 
                                                          
33 In the years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15, 57%, 49% and 42% of appeals relating to the recording of 
complaints and  40%,44% and 39% in respect of local investigations respectively were upheld (IPCC Police 
statistics 2014/15).  
34 For example it  recommends that all Police Appeals Tribunal hearing should be held in public (2014: 82).  
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approach to police recruitment, training and management and introduces a police test to guide 
when behaviour is considered to have “damaged the wider framework” of service delivery or 
placed “trust and respect” at risk (2014: 129). While these may increase the degree of individual 
officer compliance with the rule of law and may therefore have a secondary impact on police 
constitutional legitimacy, it is contended that the emphasis of the proposed reforms and indeed 
the tenor of the review appears to privilege organisational legitimacy (See 2014:10).  
More significantly, Chapman envisages the College of Policing undertaking a ‘benchmarking’ 
exercise that will lead to a line of zero tolerance being drawn, with conduct that falls below the 
line resulting in possible dismissal but all conduct above the line being subject to rehabilitative 
management interventions (2014: 74) “The question is not “did he or she do it” but “what 
should we do about it”” (Chapman 2014: 75).This is again indicative of a focus on 
organisational legitimacy in ensuring the maintenance of a well-motivated and well-disciplined 
force and as such is to be welcomed at some levels. However, the suggestion of a line of zero 
tolerance inevitably raises questions concerning where and indeed how it should be drawn. It 
is contended that in highlighting the importance of achieving a balance between organisational 
and constitutional legitimacy the framework suggested in this paper may make a valuable 
contribution to debates concerning the benchmarking exercise.  
  
Conclusion  
 
While there are undoubted links between the legitimacy of the police and the workings of the 
police complaints system, the relationship between the two is multifaceted. Importantly, what 
it means for a complaints system to be ‘effective’ is not clear-cut. This is, in part, because while 
the effectiveness of the system is seen as a necessary element in securing police legitimacy, the 
idea of police legitimacy is itself nebulous. This article has sought to provide a new framework 
for structuring the debates in this challenging terrain.  
The starting point for this has been the recognition that overall police legitimacy is complex 
and may be conceived of in terms of two ideal types, organisational and constitutional 
legitimacy. Importantly while these complement each other at some levels they conflict at 
others. Conceiving of police legitimacy as a balance between its organisational and 
constitutional elements highlights the importance of there being structures in place to facilitate 
debate concerning how that balance is reached. This puts new emphasis on the role of the police 
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complaints system in providing data that can assist in making such debate meaningful. Further, 
the application of this framework to the current complaints system in England and Wales has 
indicated some avenues for future qualitative research concerning its impact on the confidence 
of various stakeholders in both the complaints system and the police.   
This proposed conception of the complaints system is also important in relation to broader 
perspective on policing. There is evidence that the public are tolerant of some elements or 
degrees of police misconduct (Seron et al, 2004; Smith, 2009; Reiner, 2010). Further, Reiner 
has expressed concern regarding the development of a “pragmatic necessary evil discourse” in 
relation to policing.  Moreover, this should be viewed in the context of the substantial work 
confirming the degree of control that the police have over the media (Crandon and Dunn 1997, 
Mawby 1999, 2002 and 2003, Greer and Mclaughlin) and therefore their ability to promote 
such a discourse.  
In addition, the above analysis has highlighted the extent to which the police conduct 
complaints investigations such that, what has been referred to as the ‘internal face’ of 
complaints is expanded. Smith argues that “[a] person [] who has been subjected to a minor 
assault by a police officer and who does not seek legal advice, because he/she was not arrested 
or was released from custody without charge is unlikely to make a complaint” and suggests 
that incidents of this type contribute to [] ‘a generally accepted level of police wrongdoing’” 
(Smith 2009: 61). It is contended here that inappropriately unsubstantiated complaints will have 
a similar effect.  
These two points raise a concern that ‘public confidence’ in the police or the complaints system 
may be expressed in the context of expectations that are ‘inappropriately’ low on account of a 
narrative of necessary evil or an accepted level of police wrongdoing. This highlights the 
potentially limiting aspects of permitting debates concerning police legitimacy to become too 
dominated by measures of stakeholder confidence. In outlining the ideas of organisational and 
constitutional legitimacy and suggesting that they provide a valuable way in which to 
reconceptualise police complaints systems, this paper has also sought to underscore the 
importance of normative debate concerning the balance between these two forms of legitimacy.  
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